REF
LIST 3

Copy No. 3

CONFIDENTIAL
US Officials Only

097.3
Z1092C
#4378/47

THE APRIL 1947 REORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN
REF

OIR Report No. 4378

May 26, 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of Research for Far East
Division of Biographic Information

Reviewed and Distributed
by
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

CONFIDENTIAL
US Officials Only

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Summary	iv
I. Changes in Central Government Structure for the Transitional Period	1
A. General Aspects	1
1. Relationship to the Permanent Constitution	1
2. The Provisional Constitution and Kuomintang Political Tutelage	1
3. Kuomintang Government Structure	3
B. Changes in Government Organs	4
1. State Council	4
2. Executive Yuan	7
3. Legislative Yuan	9
4. Other Governmental Organs	10
C. Changes in Kuomintang Organs	11
1. Political Council	11
2. Other Organs	13
D. Evaluation of the Changes in Structure	13
II. Role of the Parties in the Transitional Government	14
A. Role of the Minor Parties or Groups	14
1. Background of Minor Party Participation	14
2. The Political Program	15
3. Evaluation of the Position of Minor Groups	17
B. New Role of the Kuomintang	19

Page

III. The Personnel Factor in Government Reorganization . . . 20

A. Representatives of the Minor Groups. 20

1. State Council 20

2. Executive Yuan 21

B. Representatives of the Kuomintang 22

1. State Council 22

2. Executive Yuan 22

3. Kuomintang Political Council. 23

APPENDIXES

Appendix A. Personnel in Reorganized Organs. 25

Table 1. State Council. 25

Table 2. Executive Yuan 26

Table 3. Kuomintang Political Council 27

Appendix B. Biographical Analysis of Selected Members of the Reorganized Government 29

I. Members of Minor Groups. 29

A. State Council 29

B. Executive Yuan 32

II. Members of the Kuomintang 35

A. State Council 35

B. Executive Yuan 40

C. Kuomintang Political Council. 40

SUMMARY

The reorganization of the Chinese Government completed on April 23 as a result of extended negotiations between Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and two small parties involves no substantial changes in the operation of the government or in its personnel. The National Government remains under the control of the Kuomintang, despite inclusion of a relatively small number of representatives of other political groups. The reorganization was effected within the framework of the provincial constitution of 1931, which was adopted for the period of Kuomintang political tutelage and is still in effect. However, the Kuomintang adopted various amendments to the Organic Law of the National Government which sets forth the organization of that government more fully than does the provisional constitution.

The reorganized government is to function during the transitional period of eight months or longer before enforcement of the permanent constitution, which at present is scheduled to go into effect December 25, 1947. Since the Kuomintang retains control, it can arrange to amend the constitution, delay its enforcement, or manipulate the elections necessary for putting it into effect.

The system whereby the Kuomintang controls the government is still in operation. The salient change in structure is the abolition of the Supreme National Defense Council, created in 1939 as the directing body

of both the government and the party. This body has been replaced by the governmental State Council and the Kuomintang Political Council as the highest policy-making organs respectively, of the government and party. The role of the State Council is likely to be insignificant because decisions will be made in the party's Policitcal Council or in the powerful Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (CEC).

A few seats in the State Council and other reorganized governmental bodies have been allotted to Democratic Socialists, the Youth Party, and independents (individuals without party membership). The Nationalists have an overwhelming majority in each body, however, as well as the support of most of the independents. Chiang Kai-shek is chairman of the State Council. As President and Nationalist Party leader, he will dominate its proceedings. The State Council has broad legal powers as a policy-making and supervising organ of the government, but its actual role appears to be chiefly that of considering decisions of the Kuomintang and transmitting them to the government organs concerned.

The Executive Yuan has not been extensively reorganized. All important posts in the Yuan are held by members of the Kuomintang or allied independents. Its President is appointed by Chiang Kai-shek, who also plays a major role in the selection of the ministers.

The Legislative Yuan, chiefly a law-drafting body, has been only slightly changed in composition and functions. No important changes

have been made in the other agencies of the Central Government or in the structure of provincial and local administration. However, the Kuomintang has promised to admit representatives of the minor parties to provincial and local governments.

The Kuomintang Political Council, the high party organ authorized before the war with Japan to direct the government, has been reconstituted by action of the Central Executive Committee. Chiang Kai-shek is chairman of the Council, which includes both appointed and ex-officio Kuomintang members from the party and the government. The Council apparently has authority to formulate basic policies to be carried out by the government. Moreover, it may request reports from party members holding governmental positions. Its extensive powers and its notable membership, which reflects the predominance of the right wing in the Kuomintang, suggest that the Political Council may be the supreme policy-making body in China. Should the Political Council not exercise its powers, the CEC Standing Committee apparently would serve as the party's policy-making organ.

The minor parties cannot exert appreciable direct influence in the government. However, since the Generalissimo desired a form of multiple-party government, the minor parties were able to condition their participation upon acceptance of a somewhat vaguely phrased political program to be carried out by the reorganized government. The program provides for several reforms, including abolition of the laws and

institutions established for Kuomintang political tutelage. If carried out, this last stipulation apparently would apply to the party secret police and other special service organizations; the Youth Corps; party control of the schools, press, and radio; and such practices as the use of public property for party purposes, by which the Nationalist Party has been able to exercise exclusive political power. Since implementation of the program would seriously impair the position of right-wing groups that dominate the Kuomintang, it seems unlikely that the reforms will be carried out.

The prominence of Kuomintang moderates in the State Council and the appointment of Chang Ch'un as President of the Executive Yuan indicate an improvement in top-ranking governmental personnel. More significant, however, is the lack of change in most administrative posts and the retention of members of the CC Clique, military groups, and other right-wing factions in key governmental positions. In the Kuomintang CEC Standing Committee and the reconstituted Kuomintang Political Council, right-wing groups predominate. Apparently they will play the major role in formulating governmental policies.

Chiang Kai-shek will undoubtedly continue to manipulate the Kuomintang groups and to make the final decisions in party and government organs. With a view to considerations of prestige at home and abroad, he has recently sponsored such apparently important measures as the new constitution and government reorganization. However, these changes

are less fundamental than the decision to attempt to liquidate Communist opposition by military means, adherence to authoritarian principles, reliance on right-wing concepts of economic and political policy, and inability to effect thoroughgoing reforms in administration.

CONFIDENTIAL
US Officials Only

THE APRIL 1947 REORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

I. CHANGES IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

A. General Aspects

1. Relationship to the Permanent Constitution. The present government as reorganized is intended to be effective during the transitional period before inauguration of a new government to be established under the permanent constitution of December 25, 1946. That document does not stipulate the date of its enforcement, but the National Assembly that adopted it resolved[1] that the necessary elections should be held before October 1, 1947 and that the constitution should be put into effect on the following December 25. In a statement of April 18, 1947, Chiang Kai-shek again asserted the government's intention of carrying out these resolutions.[2] If it does, the reorganized government may hold office approximately eight months. If civil war or other factors occasion a postponement, the present government may be in power for a longer period.

2. The Provisional Constitution and Kuomintang Political Tutelage. The new constitution, which contemplates a more democratic system of

---

1. New York Times, December 26, 1946.

2. Chinese News Service, Voice of China (hereafter cited as CNS), April 18, 1947.

government than that established by the present provisional constitution, was not the basis for the recent reorganization. The provisional constitution of 1931 remains in effect. Established for the period of Kuomintang political tutelage, it defines the terms of that tutelage, including the exercise of governing power and the right of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (CEC) to interpret the constitution. It also outlines the structure and general powers of the government. The provisional constitution has not been amended by the reorganization nor has any basic change in governmental structure been made. According to Sun Fo, leading Kuomintang liberal and authority on Chinese government, the multiparty government will operate under Kuomintang tutelage.[1]

The party has sanctioned modifications of certain applications of the doctrine of political tutelage. Some of these changes are reflected in amendments to the Organic Law of the National Government, a statutory law that sets forth the organization and powers of that government more fully than does the provisional constitution. In an amendment adopted on April 21 in accordance with proposals advanced by participating minor groups, the reference to political tutelage was modified and a statement was added that the

---

1. Ta Kung Pao, April 7, 1947, in Chinese Press Review (hereafter cited as CPR), Shanghai, April 7, 1947.

newly revised law would apply during the "transitional period" between Kuomintang tutelage and constitutionalism.[2] By another amendment the clause asserting the president's responsibility to the Kuomintang CEC was deleted.

Such amendments conflict with the provisional constitution and apparently have little practical importance, since the Kuomintang maintains political tutelage through its CEC and other party bodies that largely determine the role of Kuomintang members of the government.

3. Kuomintang Government Structure. Despite limited changes in governmental organs, in connection with which other important amendments to the Organic Law of National Government were adopted, the system of control of government by the party continues. The major structural changes is the abolition of the Supreme National Defense Council (SNDC) and the division of its powers between the reorganized governmental State Council and the reconstituted Kuomintang Political Council. The SNDC was created in 1939 as the supreme directing body of both the party and the government, supplanting the Kuomintang Political Council as a high party organ formulating policies to be carried out by the government. The powers of the SNDC were set forth in Kuomintang resolutions rather

---

1. CNS, April 21, 1947.

than in the Organic Law of the National Government. On April 17 the Kuomintang announced that the CEC had reconstituted the Political Council as the highest party organ on political affairs with authority over the party members in the government. On April 23 the SNDC was abolished. Through the Political Council the party can exercise control over the reorganized government, including the State Council. The role of the State Council as the supreme organ of the new government may therefore be rendered insignificant by decisions made in the Kuomintang Political Council or in the CEC Standing Committee. As before, important policies are likely to be formulated in party meetings rather than by government organs.

B. Changes in Government Organs

1. State Council

a. Composition. The reorganized State Council is authorized[1] to have a maximum of 40 members, but abstention of the Communists and the Democratic League has reduced the number to 29. Twelve of the 29 seats were alloted to the Kuomintang and 4 each to the Youth Party, the Democratic Socialists, and the independents (individuals without party membership). The presidents of the five Yuan, all Kuomintang leaders, are ex-officio members. Thus, 17 of

---

1. Revised Organic Law of the National Government, in FBIB, Daily Report (FE). April 22, 1947, p. PPP 2-4 RESTRICTED

the 29 seats have been alloted to the Kuomintang. In addition, the President of the National Government (Chiang Kai-shek) is chairman of the Council. Both as leader of the Kuomintang and as president, he can readily dominate the deliberations in the State Council. According to the recently revised Organic Law of the National Government, the president is to nominate and appoint the councillors. Actually, the minor party representatives were appointed on the recommendation of those parties, while the Kuomintang and independent members were selected by Chiang Kai-shek. The President and Vice President of the National Government -- the latter is a new official who is to act for the President in event of his inability to function -- are elected by the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Sun Fo, Kuomintang liberal, was chosen Vice President. The President, Vice President, and councillors serve for a term of three years or until the inauguration of the President to be elected under the new constitution. This stipulation suggests the possibility of delay in enforcement of the constitution.

b. Procedure. Apparently the State Council is to hold regular meetings every two weeks. The revised Organic Law stipulates that general or ordinary resolutions may be passed by a vote of 11 members. Resolutions affecting administrative policies, possibly the policies defined in the twelve-point political program of the reorganized

government, require a two-thirds vote of the membership. In view of the Council's composition, it is doubtful whether these procedural arrangements are significant. The same is true of the provisions concerning a presidential veto and the Council's authority to override this veto by a three-fifths vote of the members. Although the presence of a small number of minor party representatives may contribute a slight element of political competition in Council discussions, the role of Chiang Kai-shek and his appointees may be expected to be decisive.

c. Powers. According to the revised Organic Law, the State Council may consider and decide on legislative principles; financial, military, and administrative policies; appointment of ministers in the Executive Yuan and of members of the Legislative and Control Yuan; matters submitted by the president or introduced by three or more members; and questions in dispute between the Yuan. The grant of power is substantially the same as in the Political Consultative Council (PCC) agreement of January 1946. On paper these powers are extensive, although less far reaching than those formerly exercised by the Supreme National Defense Council. In his statement of April 18, Chiang Kai-shek characterized the State Council as "the nation's highest policy-making body" and said that it would "direct" national affairs during the

transitional period.[1] However, available evidence indicates that the State Council is expected to made decisions reflecting those of the Kuomintang. The Minister of Information stated on April 17 that decisions of the Kuomintang Political Council would be binding on party members of the State Council.[2]

Consequently, the State Council cannot be expected to assume a vital or determining role in policy-making or in general supervision of administration. Its role may be basically that of considering decisions of the Kuomintang and passing them on to the governmental organs concerned. However, the minor party councillors have a limited opportunity for raising questions, making suggestions, and discussing governmental problems in the State Council.

2. Executive Yuan. The Executive Yuan has not been extensively reorganized. The principal changes are the provisions for five to seven Ministers without Portifolio (six were appointed) and the elevation to ministries of the Land and Public Health Administrations and the Water Conservancy Board. The Organic Law of the Executive Yuan[3] was revised to provide for a Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and creation of other new ministries was discussed, but these ministries did not appear in the list announced on April 23. In view of minor party

---

1. CNS, April 18, 1947

2. New York Times, April 18, 1947.

3. FBIB, Daily Report, April 24, 1947, p. PPP 3, RESTRICTED.

proposals for the separation of Kuomintang agencies from the government, the Kuomintang Ministry of Information, which has been connected with the Executive Yuan, was reorganized. Some sections remained in the party ministry while others were transferred to the new Government Information Office, the director of which was given ministerial rank.[1]

The president, secretary general, and all important ministers of the Executive Yuan are Kuomintang leaders. The vice-president is an independent who has been serving as a minister. Of the 18 administrative posts, 2 were alloted to the Youth Party and 3 to independents,[2] 2 of whom were already in the Executive Yuan. Of the 6 seats to be occupied by Ministers without Portfolio, the Kuomintang received 2, the Democratic Socialists 2, the Youth Party 1, and the independents 1. Although some Kuomintang ministers were shifted to different posts in the Executive Yuan, none was excluded and only one was added. On the Political Affairs Committee of the Yuan, composed of ministers and charged with discussing administrative policies, the Kuomintang has 15 members, the Youth Party 3, the Democratic Socialists 2, and the independents 4.

The President of the Executive Yuan is one of the most important government officials in China. Like the heads of the other Yuan, he is appointed by President Chiang Kai-shek; however, according to the political program, the minor parties must give prior approval. Under

---

1. Ibid., p. BBB 6-7, RESTRICTED.
2. CNS, April 23, 1947.

the revised Organic Law, the ministers are to be appointed by the State Council, but appointments are to be based on recommendations of President Chiang at the instance of the Yuan head. In the reorganization of April 23, the selection was actually made by Chiang after consultation with leaders of the various parties and was formally endorsed by the State Council. In the Executive Yuan, as in the State Council, President Chiang's control is apparent.

The reorganized Executive Yuan has no new powers. It continues to be responsible for preparing bills and budgets for submission to the Legislative Yuan, for appointing certain classes of government officials, for settling disputes between ministries, and for various other matters. Since the role of the ministries also remains virtually unchanged, the Executive Yuan reorganization represents chiefly a slight increase in personnel and has limited significance.

3. Legislative Yuan. The only revision in the Organic Law of the National Government[1] required for reorganization of the Legislative Yuan stipulated that the previous maximum of 99 members be increased by 50. As announced on March 1, the Kuomintang was alloted 17 of the 50 new seats; the Democratic Socialists were alloted 13; the Youth Party, 12; and the independents, 8.[2] The addition of these non-Kuomintang members does not significantly change the composition of the Legislative Yuan, since the 99 old members had all been appointed by the Kuomintang.

---

1. FBIB, Daily Report (FE), April 22, 1947, p. PPP 5-6, RESTRICTED.
2. Ibid., March 3, 1947, p. BBB 2, RESTRICTED; T-419, Nanking, March 4, 1947, SECRET.

In deference to the wishes of minority party leaders, the Kuomintang agreed, in the twelve-point political program, to try experimentally "the responsible Executive Yuan system" in accordance with the spirit of the new constitution, which gives the Legislative Yuan a measure of control over administrative policy. It is specifically stated in the program that the ministers shall answer questions in the Legislative Yuan regarding proposed legislation.[1] The changes made, however, while creating opportunities for Legislative Yuan discussion of government policies and questioning of administrative officials, do not seem likely to result in the degree of legislative control over the Executive Yuan favored by minor party leaders.

4. Other Governmental Organs. In accordance with proposals by the minority parties that the Control Yuan and the People's Political Council be reorganized, the membership of these bodies was expanded on March 1. Of the 25 additional seats in the Control Yuan, which previously had a maximum of 49, 9 were alloted to the Nationalist Party, 6 to the Youth Party, 7 to the Democratic Socialists, and 3 to the independents. The Control Yuan, which is a supervisory organ with power to audit, censure, and impeach, has no new authority. Each group received 11 additional seats in the People's Political Council, which already had approximately 290 members. This body has served since 1938 as a national forum to which the Kuomintang appointed a few minor party

---

1. CNS, April 18, 1947.

leaders and independents, all as worthy individuals rather than as political leaders. Since neither of these organs plays a significant role in the government and since an overwhelming majority of their members are also members of the Kuomintang, the recent expansion serves merely to give these organs a somewhat more representative character.

C. Changes in Kuomintang Organs

1. Political Council. On April 17, the date on which the reorganization of the National Government State Council was made public, the Ministry of Information also announced that the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee had reconstituted the Kuomintang Political Council.[1] Before its suspension in 1937, the Council had served as the party's policy-making body, directing the National Government.[2] The reconstituted Political Council may play a similar role.

a. Composition. The Organic Law of the Political Council, as revised by the CEC on April 1, 1947, states that the Council shall be composed of from 19 to 25 members recommended by the party leader (Chiang Kai-shek) for election by the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.[3] The CEC is to appoint the secretary general, who is to head the Council's secretariat. In addition, the members of the Standing Committees of the Kuomintang CEC (36 in number) and the Central Supervisory

---

1. New York Times, April 18, 1947.
2. China Handbook, 1937-43, pp. 84-86.
3. FBIB, Daily Report (FE), April 24, 1947, p. PPP 1-2, RESTRICTED; Ministry of Information, International Department, Daily Bulletin, April 19, 1947.

Committee (12), the Kuomintang members of the State Council (17), and the Kuomintang director of the Civil Affairs Department of the National Government, a hitherto unimportant official, are all ex-officio members. Chiang, as party leader, is chairman of the Political Council. The Council thus comprises the most prominent leaders of both the party and government and its composition is broadly similar to that of the recently abolished Supreme National Defense Council. Like that body, it is to meet weekly or biweekly or whenever specially convened by the chairman.

b. Powers. As the party's "highest directive organ on political affairs,"[1] the Political Council has far reaching influence. Its powers, as set forth in the Council's Organic Law, include the authority to make decisions on "plans for execution of the political program and policy of the party," to adopt "guiding principles for settlement of important problems," to request reports from party members who are government ministers and heads of the Yuan, to select party members to serve in the government as political officials (non-civil service) and in "people's representative bodies," and to determine other matters referred to the Council by the CEC. Decisions are to be reported to the CEC, and party members concerned are simultaneously to be instructed to carry them out. The Chairman is authorized to act for the Council in emergency situations.

This grant of authority appears to embrace the formulation of

---

1. FBIB, Daily Report (FE), April 24, 1947, p. PPP 1, RESTRICTED.

basic policies and to establish direct responsibility of Kuomintang government officials to the Political Council.

2. Other Organs. No vital changes have been made in other party organs. The abolition of the Supreme National Defense Council as a party organ was a concomitant of reconstruction of the Political Council. The party's Ministry of Information was reorganized by transferring the International Department and other units to the new Government Information Office.[1] In the March session of the CEC, which authorized the government and party reorganization, right-wing groups, especially the CC faction, dominated the proceedings and tightened their control of party organs.[2]

D. Evaluation of the Changes in Structure

On paper at least, the basic change in the structure of the government is the reorganization of the State Council as the supreme directing agency of the National Government. Changes made in the Executive Yuan are less important and those in other governmental bodies appear relatively insignificant. No changes whatsoever have been made in the majority of Central Government administrative offices and agencies or in the realm of provincial and local government. However, the Kuomintang has promised to permit minor party representatives to participate in provincial and local government.

---

1. FBIB, Daily Report (FE), pp. BBB 6-7, RESTRICTED.

2. New York Times, March 25, 1947.

Through its members and allied independents, the Kuomintang has overwhelming control of all governmental bodies and all important administrative posts. President Chiang, by virtue of his position as party leader and his governmental authority, dominates the State Council and the Executive Yuan.

Moreover, it is apparently intended that the newly formed Kuomintang Political Council will formulate policies and supervise their execution by the National Government. This body, rather than the State Council, may be the supreme policy-making body in China. It is a major instrument through which the Nationalist Party may control the reorganized government and continue political tutelage. Should these functions not be performed by the Political Council, they would apparently be assumed by the Kuomintang CEC Standing Committee.

II. ROLE OF THE PARTIES IN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

A. Role of the Minor Parties or Groups

1. Background of Minor Party Participation. The Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, which were formerly included in the Democratic League, have been under great pressure to accept a role in the National Government since their conditional acceptance of participation in the National Assembly in November 1946. On November 20, 1946, the Kuomintang CEC and the Supreme National Defense Council approved the plan for expanding the Executive Yuan and the State

Council,[1] and during the next five months government spokesmen made frequent statements regarding the imminence of, or the difficulties encountered in effecting, government reorganization.

The delay was occasioned partly by intra-Kuomintang problems and partly by the attitude of the minority party leaders. The minority leaders delayed participation in order to ascertain whether the National Assembly would adopt the kind of constitution promised by Chiang Kai-shek; whether an inter-party conference or other machinery might be effective in halting or limiting the civil war; and whether the Kuomintang could be expected to end political tutelage and adopt reforms and policies calculated to make possible the establishment of constitutional government in December 1947. They were deterred also by the prospect of having governmental responsibilities but little power and by the increasingly critical military and economic situation in China. Eventually both parties, with apparent reluctance, agreed to limited participation. However, dissatisfaction with their role and with government policies has caused several leaders in each party to refuse the appointments offered them by the Kuomintang.

2. The Political Program. The political program announced on April 18 is a twelve-point agreement concluded by minority groups with the Kuomintang or principles to be carried out during the transitional

---

1. FBIS, Daily Report (FE), November 21, 1946, p. CA 4, RESTRICTED.

period.[1] Much of the program is vague, e.g., the acceptance of the 1946 PCC agreement on "Peaceful National Reconstruction" as the "guiding principle" for the reorganized government and the declaration that reliance on political methods will be the basic principle for solving the Communist problem. The latter statement is modified by a further declaration that the government will seek such a settlement only after resortation of the railways, an objective that apparently can be attained only by successful military operations.

The political program sets forth certain governmental principles not specifically embodied in the National Government's revised Organic Law, such as the obligation of the Executive Yuan to carry out State Council decisions, the Executive Yuan's responsibility to the Legislative Yuan, and the president's duty to obtain the approval of political groups in the government before appointing the head of the Executive Yuan.

The program also provides for guarantees of civil liberties, which had often been promised but not actually granted by the Kuomintang, and stipulates that any restrictions shall be based on laws approved by the State Council. Infringement of civil liberties has been a major concern of the minor parties and of Kuomintang liberals. The program further provides that laws and institutions created especially for Kuomintang political tutelage shall be abolished. If carried out, this provision apparently would apply to the secret police and other

---

1. CNS, April 18, 1947.

special service organizations; party control of education, press, and radio; the privileged position of army officers; and the various devices, such as use of public funds and properties for party purposes, by which the Kuomintang has monopolized political power. Such reforms would seriously impair the position of right-wing Kuomintang groups. Since these groups control the party, they are likely to prevent full implementation of the stipulated reforms.

The program also calls for reforms in finance and taxation, changes in provincial administration and policies, and conditional participation of minor party groups in local and provincial government. This last point was pressed particularly by the Youth Party, which has asked for provincial governorships and other important posts as well as for a share in the administration of government enterprises.

3. Evaluation of the Position of the Minor Groups. It is evident that the two minor parties cannot exert appreciable direct influence in the government. Curtailment by the Kuomintang of functions of the Ministry of Economic Affairs symbolized the Kuomintang's reluctance to relinquish control of even the lesser responsibilities and apparently led the Youth Party appointee to decline the ministry.[1] The minor parties, however, may exert pressure by refusing to participate since the Kuomintang needs their help in maintaining the appearance of multi-party government during the transitional period.

---

1. New York Times, April 28, 1947.

Prominent leaders of the minor parties have refused to take office and others have refused to sanction party participation because of the Kuomintang's failure thus far to guarantee civil liberties and carry out various reforms. Although the controlling leadership of both the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialist Party agreed upon government reorganization, there were dissident elements in both parties. Carson Chang, leader of the Democratic Socialists, resisted considerable pressure to accept an appointment. Two of the party's four seats in the State Council are unoccupied. Moreover, several members of the Democratic Socialist Central Executive Committee denounced the party's decision to join the government and threatened to split the party.[1] Spokesmen for the Youth Party and the Democratic Socialists have issued statements explaining their decision to participate and implying that failure of the government to promote reforms and changes satisfactory to them might occasion their withdrawal.[2]

The independents apparently have not been an important factor in effecting government reorganization, although they sanctioned the political program. Only three of the nine independents who were in the PCC appear in the reorganized government. Other prominent independents, such as Hu Shih, former Ambassador to the US, refused

---

1. Wen Hui Pao, April 17, 1947, in CPR, April 22, 1947; Ta Kung Pao, April 19, 1947, in CPR, April 19, 1947.

2. FBIB, Daily Report (FE), April 24, pp. BBB 4-5, and April 25, pp. BBB 1-2, RESTRICTED.

to take office.

B. New Role of the Kuomintang

Since the Kuomintang remains in control of all organs of government, the significance of the reorganization depends very largely on the character and policies of the Kuomintang leaders. The prominence of Kuomintang moderates and liberals in the State Council and Chang Ch'un's appointment as President of the Executive Yuan evidence a limited improvement in top-ranking personnel. To a considerable extent, however, this change is balanced by the lack of important changes in key administrative posts and by retention of members of the CC Clique, military groups, and other right-wing factions in positions of power.

In this governmental balance of forces the Generalissimo will continue to play a predominant role. With a view to considerations of prestige at home and abroad, he has recently sponsored such apparently important measures as the new constitution and government reorganization. These changes are less fundamental, however, than the recent decision to attempt to suppress the Communists by armed force, adherence to authoritarian principles, apparent reliance on right-wing Kuomintang concepts of economic and political policy, and inability to effect thoroughgoing reforms in administration. Consequently, the Generalissimo may be expected to give to the liberals and moderates in the government only a qualified support that may prove insufficient for the avowed purposes of government reorganization.

The changes in the government may be largely nullified, furthermore, by the operations of the Kuomintang and its various agencies. Of particular significance is the reconstitution of the Kuomintang Political Council as the highest party organ on political affairs, with extensive powers to formulate policies and control Kuomintang leaders in the government and a membership composed largely of right-wing groups. Its composition is significant not merely as a reflection of right-wing predominance in Kuomintang organs but also as evidence of Chiang Kai-shek's personal appointments to the party's policy-making body. The Standing Committee, as the supreme party organ to which the Political Council is responsible, is also an important policy-making and supervisory body.

The role of the Youth Corps, the party police, the party ministries, and other Kuomintang agencies has been little changed, and these bodies also operate in the interests of the right-wing groups. Restrained by the influence and power of militarists and other right-wing groups and faced by a severe economic and political crisis, the reorganized government will have great difficulty in effecting reforms and improving administration.

III. THE PERSONNEL FACTOR IN GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

A. Representatives of the Minor Groups

1. State Council. The independents in the State Council are chiefly men who have held important government posts; the minor party repre-

sentatives are mainly intellectuals whose administrative and political talents are not well known. Of the four independents in the State Council, K. P. Chen, Shanghai banker, and Wang Yun-wu, Shanghai publisher, are considered able moderates; the others serve to represent Manchuria and Sinkiang. Only two Democratic Socialists, relatively unknown elders from North China, have taken their seats. Tseng Ch'i, the Youth Party leader, and his associates are more favorably disposed toward Kuomintang leadership than are the Democratic Socialists. With two or three exceptions, the ten representatives of minor groups are men of limited political capacity and influence.

2. Executive Yuan. In the Executive Yuan no important ministerial post is held by a newly appointed representative of a minor group. Wang Yun-wu, former Minister of Economic Affairs, has been appointed Vice-President of the Executive Yuan in place of Weng Wen-hao, Kuomintang moderate. Hsu Shih-ying, Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, is an elederly funotionary and former prime minister. Miao Yun-t'ai, prominent Yunnanese industrialist, who in the past supported the liberal Democratic League, is a Minister without Portfolio. Li Huang, Youth Party member, declined his appointment as Minister of Economic Affairs and was replaced by Ch'en Chi-t'ien, another Youth Party intellectual, on May 19. Tso Shun-sheng, publisher of the Youth Party newspaper in Shanghai, and former Acting President of the Democratic League, assumed the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry after considerable delay. Chu'ang Nai-te, history professor and Youth

Party leader, is a Minister without Portfolio. Chiang Yun-t'ien, a journalist, and Li Tai-ming, who has been active among overseas Chinese, are the Democratic Socialist Ministers without Portfolio. With a few exceptions, the ten representatives of the minor groups are not likely to play a significant role in the Executive Yuan.

B. Representatives of the Kuomintang

1. State Council. Of the 17 Kuomintang members appointed to the State Council, 4 -- Chang Ch'un, Wang Shih-chieh, Weng Wen-hao, and Wang Ch'ung-hui -- are relatively able members of the moderate Political Science group and 2 others -- Chiang Mon-lin and Shao Li-tzu -- are moderates believed to be associated with this group. Sun Fo is the outstanding liberal. T. V. Soong, who until recently headed the Executive Yuan, is best known as a conservative financier. Six or 7 members may be classed as party elders of limited ability loyal to the party's right-wing leadership and 2 -- Ch'en Pu-lei and Wu Chung-hsin -- as personal followers of Chiang Kai-shek.

The right-wing CC and militarist groups are not represented on the Council. However, the moderates are not a unified group and few of them are outstanding political leaders. Chiang Kai-shek, chairman of the State Council, is the dominant personality.

2. Executive Yuan. The Kuomintang personnel in the Executive Yuan was not greatly changed, but Chang Ch'un, leader of the Political Science group, is the new President of the Yuan. Hollington Tong,

official biographer of Chiang Kai-shek and former Vice Minister of the party's Ministry of Information, is Director of the Information Office. Liu Wei-chih, Minister of Overseas Chinese Affairs, and Kan Nai-kuang, Secretary General of the Yuan, reportedly are followers of Sun Fo. Li Ching-chai, Minister of Land Administration, is considered a member of the CC Clique. The affiliation of Lei Chen, Minister without Portfolio, who participated in the recent negotiations with minor party leaders, is not known. Most of the 17 Kuomintang members of the Executive Yuan are not new, but Chang Ch'un as President may exert a salutary influence. To be effective, however, he will need strong support from Chiang Kai-shek.

3. Kuomintang Political Council. Of the 24 appointed members of the Kuomintang Political Council, the majority are lesser figures of the CC and militarist groups. Ch'en Li-fu, leader of the CC Clique, is Secretary General. The ex-officio members constitute a larger group of prominent leaders in the party and the government. Of the total membership of about 80, 15 belong to the CC group, 15 to the militarist group, and 13 to the group of party elders, while the Political Science and other factions have a smaller representation.

The right-wing groups therefore have a majority on the Political Council, of which Chiang Kai-shek as party leader is chairman. These elements are also predominant in the powerful Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee, of which Chiang is also chairman.

Its 36 members are ex-officio members of the Political Council.

Since the Kuomintang members of the government are subordinated to the party, the moderates apparently will not have an influential voice in deciding governmental policies.

APPENDIX A

PERSONNEL IN REORGANIZED ORGANS

Table 1. STATE COUNCIL

	Kuomintang Factions						Minor Groups		
	CC Clique	Military	Political Science	Elder	Other	Unknown	Democratic Socialist	Youth Party	Independent
Chang Chi				X					
Chang Chia Hutuketu						X			
Chang Ch'un			X						
Ch'en Chi-t'ien								X	
Ch'en Pu-lei						X			
Chen, K. P. (Chen Kuang-pu)									X
Chi I-ch'iao							X		
Chiang Kai-shek, chairman					X				
Chiang Mon-lin						X			
Chu Cheng				X					
Ho Lu-chih								X	
Hu Hai-men							X		
Mo Te-hui									X
Niu Yung-chien				X					
Pao-erh-han									X
Shao Li-tzu				X					
Soong, T. V.					X				
Sun Fo					X				
Tai Chi-tao				X					
Tseng Ch'i								X	
Tsou Lu				X					
Wang Ch'ung-hui			X						
Wang Shih-chieh			X						
Wang Yun-wu									X
Weng Wen-hao			X						
Wu Chung-hsin						X			
Yu Chia-chu								X	
Yu Yu-jen				X					
TOTALS	0	0	4	7	3	4	2	4	4

Table 2. EXECUTIVE YUAN

		Kuomintang Factions						Minor Groups		
		CC Clique	Military	Political Science	Elder	Other	Unknown	Democratic Socialist	Youth Party	Independent
Chang Ch'un[a]	President			X						
Chang Li-sheng	Interior	X								
Ch'ang Nai-te[a]	Without Portfolio								X	
Ch'en Chi-t'ien[a]	Economic Affairs								X	
Chiang Yun-t'ien[a]	Without Portfolio							X		
Chu Chia-hua	Education					X				
Hsieh Kuan-sheng	Justice						X			
Hsu Shih-ying[a]	Mongolian & Tibetan Affairs									X
Hsueh Tu-pi	Water Conservancy					X				
Kan Nai-kuang[a]	Secretary General					X				
Ku Cheng-kang	Social Affairs	X								
Ku Cheng-lun	Food	X								
Lei Chen[a]	Without Portfolio						X			
Li Ching-chai[a]	Land Administration	X								
Li Tai-ming[a]	Without Portfolio							X		
Liu Wei-chih[a]	Overseas Chinese Affairs					X				
Miao Yun-t'ai[a]	Without Portfolio									X
Pai Ch'ung-hsi	National Defense		X							
P'eng Hsueh-p'ei	Without Portfolio						X			
Tong, Hollington K.	Information						X			
Tso Shun-sheng[a]	Agriculture & Forestry								X	
Tsur, Y. T.	Health									X
Wang Shih-chieh	Foreign Affairs			X						
Wang Yun-wu	Vice President									X
Weng Wen-hao	National Resources			X						
Yu Ta-wei	Communications									X
Yui, O. K.	Finance			X						
TOTAL		4	1	4	0	4	4	2	3	5

a. New members.

CONFIDENTIAL

Table 3. KUOMINTANG POLITICAL COUNCIL

	Factions					
	CC Clique	Military	Political Science	Elder	Other	Unknown
Chang Chi[a]				X		
Chang Chia Hutuktu[a]						X
Chang Chih-chung						X
Chang Chih-pen						X
Chang Ch'un[b]			X			
Chang Jen-chieh[c]						X
Chang Li-sheng[b]	X					
Chang Mo-chen (Miss)						X
Chang Tao-fan	X					
Ch'en Ch'eng		X				
Ch'en Chi-t'ang[c]		X				
Ch'en Kuo-fu	X					
Ch'en Li-fu[c]	X					
Ch'en Pu-lei					X	
Ch'eng Ch'ien[c]		X				
Cheng Yen-feng[c]					X	
Chi Shih-ying[c]	X					
Chiang Kai-shek, chairman					X	
Chiang Mon-lin[a]						X
Ch'ien Ta-chun		X				
Chu Cheng[a]				X		
Chu Chi-ch'ing				X		
Chu Chia-hua[b]					X	
Chu Shao-liang[c]		X				
Fang Chih[c]	X					
Feng Yu-hsiang[c]		X				
Ho Chung-han		X				
Ho Ying-ch'in[a,c]		X				
Hsiao Cheng						X
Hsiao, T. T.				X		
Hsiung Ko-chun[c]						X
Hsu K'an[a,c]	X					
Hsu Yung-ch'ang[c]		X				
Kan Nai-kuang[b,c]					X	
Kang Tse		X				
Ku Cheng-kang[b]	X					
Ku Cheng-ting[c]	X					
Kung, H. H.					X	
Lai Lien	X					
Li Ching-chai[b,c]	X					
Li Wen-fan						X
Li Tsung-jen[c]		X				

Table 3. KUOMINTANG POLITICAL COUNCIL (Continued)

	Factions					
	CC Clique	Military	Political Science	Elder	Other	Unknown
Li Yu-ying[c]					X	
Li Yung-hsin						X
Liang Han-chao	X					
Liu Chien-chun		X				
Liu Ko-shu				X		
Liu Wen-tao						X
Lu Chung-lin[c]		X				
Lu Tang-ping						X
Masud						X
Niu Yung-chien[a]				X		
Pai Ch'ung-hsi[b]		X				
Pai Yun-t'i				X		
P'an Kung-chan	X					
P'eng Hsueh-p'ei[b,c]					X	
Mme. Sun Yat-sen					X	
Shao Hua						X
Shao Li-tzu[a]				X		
Soong, T. V.[a]					X	
Sun Fo[a]					X	
Tai Chi-tao (Ch'uan-hsien)				X		
Tien Kun-shan						X
Ting Wei-fen				X		
Tseng Yang-fu[c]	X					
Tsou Lu[a]				X		
Wang Chi-kang						X
Wang Ch'ung-hui[a]			X			
Wang Ping-an				X		
Wang Shih-chieh[a,b]			X			
Weng Wen-hao[a,b]			X			
Wu Ching-heng						X
Wu Chung-hsin[a]						X
Wu Ti'eh-cheng			X			
Yao Tao-hai						X
Yen Hsi-shan[c]		X				
Yu Ching-t'ang[c]	X					
Yu Yu-jen[a]				X		
Yuan Shan-chien[c]						X
TOTALS	15	15	5	13	11	20

a. Also members of State Council.
b. Also members of Executive Yuan.
c. Appointed members.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX B

BIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE REORGANIZED GOVERNMENT[1]

I. MEMBERS OF MINOR GROUPS

A. State Council

1. Independents. The four independents who were appointed to the State Council -- MO Te-hui, WANG Yun-wu, PAO-ERH-HAN (Burkhan), and K. P. CHEN -- have had administrative experience. However, two -- PAO-ERH-HAN and MO Te-hui -- were probably chosen more for regional considerations than previous experience.

K. P. CHEN (CHEN Kuan-pu), the best-known internationally of the four, has an excellent reputation in international banking and financial circles. He was founder and manager of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, which has been known as an efficiently administered bank. He headed the Chinese Financial Mission to the US in 1938-40 and has a good reputation in the US. He also is reported to be highly regarded by Chiang Kai-shek.

WANG Yun-wu, who is now the Vice-President of the Executive Yuan,

---

1. Biographical data used in this Appendix have been obtained from the files of the Division of Biographic Information, Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, and acknowledgment is hereby made for the cooperation of that Division in the preparation of this analysis. More detailed information on lesser known members of the State and Political Councils may be found in OIR-4376, May 1, 1947.

has been known in the past as a publisher, an educator, and a writer. He was Minister of Economic Affairs until the reorganization, was a delegate to the National Assembly in 1946, and has served as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the China Textile Development Corporation. He is said to be well regarded by the liberals and to have the admiration of T. V. Soong.

MO Te-hui is a Manchurian who has had a long administrative career as head of the Chinese Eastern Railway. He was a member of the Praesidium of the People's Political Council (PPC). He is also an old friend of Chiang Hsueh-liang, the former warlord of Manchuria.

PAO-ERH-HAN is the Uigur (Turki) Vice Governor of Sinkiang Province. He is the highest-ranking native Sinkiang provincial official who did not participate in the I-ning revolt.

2. Members of Democratic Socialist Party. Only two members of the Democratic Socialist Party -- HU Hai-men and CHI I-ch'iao -- have so far been willing to join the State Council. These two men are not prominent in the party. HU Hai-men is a veteran member and the representative of the Northern Branch of the Democratic Socialist Party. He has long been a friend of Carson Chang. CHI I-ch'iao is a military man who was formerly on the Military Advisory Board. WU Hsien-tse and other leaders of the party refused to accept any appointment.

3. Youth Party Members. The four Youth Party selections for the State Council -- TSENG Ch'i, CH'EN Chi-t'ien, YU Chia-chu, and HO Lu-chih -- the "Elder Clique" of the party, which has controlled

the Youth Party since its founding in Paris in 1923.

They were anti-Kuomintang and anti-Communist in the early period of the Youth Party, but in 1938 they became members of the People's Political Council and have since cooperated with the Kuomintang to the extent of service in the National Assembly. During recent years they have been known as "pro-Kuomintang." The Elder Clique broke with the Democratic League in 1945 over the question of cooperation with the Kuomintang and since that time has been more favorably disposed toward the party.

TSENG Ch'i is reputed to have dealt with the puppets and the Japanese during the war, and the Communists have made capital of these unconfirmed reports. Tseng is strongly anti-Communist.

CH'EN Chi-t'ien, a professor and publisher, has been connected with the government as a member of the People's Political Council and delegate to the National Assembly. YU Chia-chu's career has been similar to Ch'en Chi-t'ien's. HO Lu-chih was at one time President of Shantung University and has been a member of the People's Political Council since 1945.

During 1946 Tseng and his associates, in opposition to the right-wing elements in the Kuomintang, put themselves on record as favoring a political solution of the Kuomintang-Communist issues, recognition of political parties, liquidation of tutelage, and reorganization of local governments on a basis somewhat similar to American federalism.

B. Executive Yuan

Of the five Yuan, only the Executive Yuan has a new president -- CHANG Ch'un, leader of the Political Science Clique. Some minor party members and independents hold positions in this Yuan, but the important administrative posts remain firmly in the control of the right-wing conservatives of the Kuomintang Party.

One of the outstanding facts about the reorganization of the Executive Yuan is that most of the important ministries remain under the same leadership as before. The ministers who retain their old positions are CHANG Li-sheng (Minister of Interior), KU Cheng-kang (Minister of Social Affairs), KU Cheng-lun (Minister of Food), all members of the CC Clique; O. K. YUI (Minister of Finance), WANG Shih-chieh (Minister of Foreign Affairs), members of the Political Science Clique; PAI Ch'ung-hsi (Minister of National Defense), former leader of the Kwangsi military clique; CHU Chia-hua (Minister of Education), leader of a rightist group; HSIEH Kuan-sheng (Minister of Justice), whose affiliation is unknown; HSUEH Tu-pi (Minister of Water Conservancy), a follower of Feng Yu-hsiang; and General YU Ta-wei (Minister of Communications), are independent.

1. Independents. Of the 27 members of the Executive Yuan, 5 are non-party men and 4 of these independents have previously held positions in this Yuan. YU Ta-wei, who is close to the right wing of the

Kuomintang Party, continues as Minister of Communications, and Y. T. TSUR, formerly Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, is now Minister of Public Health. WANG Yun-wu, formerly Minister of Economics, has become Vice-President of the Executive Yuan. HSU Shih-ying, appointed Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, is an old functionary who was once an official under the Manchus. In his earlier days he held several prominent government posts; he held his present position once before. The fifth independent is MIAO Yun-t'ai, Minister without Portfolio. Miao is a prominent Yunnanese industrialist who has been credited with aiding the industrialization and modernization of Yunnan Province. He has given financial and moral support to the Democratic League, but disclaims close connection with it. The Communists recommended him for one of the seats on the Political Consultative Council.

2. Members of Democratic Socialist Party. The Democratic Socialist members of the Yuan are LI Tai-ming and CHIANG Yun-t'ien, both Ministers without Portfolio. LI Tai-ming, now a member of his party's Central Executive Committee, was leader of the Constitutionalist Party, which opposed the conservative Kuomintang Party leadership among overseas Chinese in the United States and Canada. He conceived of the party as a buffer between the Kuomintang and the Communists. In August of 1946 the Constitutionalist Party and the National Socialist Parties were

merged into what is now the Democratic Socialist Party, the leader of which is Carson Chang.

CHIANG Yun-t'ien is relatively new to the political scene. He served as a secretary of the Political Consultative Council in January 1946 and as a delegate to the National Assembly in November 1946. In March 1947 he was sent by Carson Chang to urge South China Democratic Socialist leaders to go to Shanghai in an attempt to reach a compromise on the question of participation in the reorganized government. Chiang Yun-t'ien explained that the hesitancy of the party was a result of its doubt that its participation would bring about any improvement in the over-all situation.

3. Youth Party Members. After LI Huang, Youth Party leader, refused to accept the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the post was given to Ch'en Chi-t'ien, who was already in the State Council. The Youth Party is represented also by TSO Shun-sheng, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and CH'ANG Nai-te, Minister without Portfolio. Tso is now head of the publicity department of the Young China Party, which he represented on the People's Political Council for four consecutive terms. He was one of the PPC members who visited Yenan to ask the Chinese Communist Party to reopen peace talks with the National Government. Ch'ang is reportedly an important member of the Youth Party, serving as director of its Central Organization Board. He was a delegate to the National Assembly in November 1946 and has been a member of

the People's Political Council since 1938.

II. MEMBERS OF THE KUOMINTANG

A. State Council

The representation of the Kuomintang Party on the State Council falls into three major categories: the Political Science Clique, the party elders, and individuals outside of these two groups.

1. Members of the Political Science Clique. The members of the Political Science Clique in the State Council are CHANG Ch'un (President of the Executive Yuan), WANG Shih-chieh (also Minister of Foreign Affairs), WENG Wen-Hao (also National Resources Commissioner), and WANG Ch'ung-hui, who now holds no other government post than that of State Councillor.

CHANG Ch'un, one of the early revolutionists, has been a party and government official for many years. He has always been close to Chiang Kai-shek and is reported to be influential in inner party circles. Before the Japanese invasion he supported the Generalissimo in his Japanese appeasement policy, but later, as Foreign Minister, he evidenced some resistance to it. Chang is said to favor a strengthened Central Government. He has a progressive attitude toward the industrial development of China and is particularly friendly toward the United States. He is honest, moderate, and an efficient administrator.

WANG Ch'ung-hui, long experienced in the government, is considered to be one of the outstanding jurists in China. Although he is

reported to be able, fair, and honest, he apparently lacks influence in the political field and tends to follow rather than to lead. He is Western in outlook and friendly toward the United States.

WANG Shih-chieh, a close and trusted advisor of Chiang Kai-shek, is generally considered honest and relatively liberal. However, he has not taken a strong hand against the more conservative right-wing element of the Kuomintang Party. Wang is oriented toward the Western democracies, especially toward Great Britain.

WENG Wen-hao is an outstanding geologist. He is said to be one of the ablest ministers in the government and is considered one of the most progressive and politically adept men in the Political Science group.

2. Party Elders. The Kuomintang "party elders" are those who were among the early revolutionists and who have had long and, for the most part, undistinguished careers in the party and the government. They are loyal to Chiang Kai-shek and can generally be counted on to adhere closely to the policies of the party. The party elders in the State Council are TSOU Lu, TAI Chi-tao (President of the Examination Yuan), NIU Yung-chien, CHANG Chi, YU Yu-jen (President of the Control Yuan), CHU Cheng (President of the Judicial Yuan), and SHAO Li-tzu.

TSOU Lu in his early days was associated with General Feng Yu-hsiang and later worked with Chen Chiung-ming to expel Sun Yat-sen from Canton. As a member of the rightist Western Hills faction in

1926, he opposed the Soviet orientation of the Kuomintang Party. Tsou later joined a separatist group backed by the Kwangsi warlords in an anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign. From the time of his appointment as State Councillor in 1932, however, there have been no further reports of his alignment against the Generalissimo.

TAI Chi-tao, a State Councillor since 1925, is reported to be able to influence Chiang Kai-shek, but is said to be heartily disliked by Mme. Sun Yat-sen. According to one source, he is a strong supporter of Chu Chia-hua, the Minister of Education. Tai is one of the three members of the Drafting Committee who prepared the Organic Law of the reorganized government in 1928.

NIU Yung-chien has held many positions in the government and the Kuomintang Party. He supported the Chiang Kai-shek forces during the Northern Expedition. In 1944 he was sent to Tihua to investigate the political situation in Sinkiang.

CHANG Chi's strong opposition to the Communists and his prestige as an early founder of the nationalist movement are probably the reasons for his appointment.

YU Yu-jen is said to be unfitted for his post in the Control Yuan, although his personal integrity is not criticized. He is old and reportedly brushes off reports of maladministration and forms an excellent front for corruption. He is reported to be a follower of Sun Fo and not entirely unsympathetic to the Communists. Yu is a

prominent Shensi man, which fact carries considerable weight with the Kuomintang Party since the northern part of Shensi is a Communist stronghold.

CHU Cheng's long service as President of the Judicial Yuan and State Councillor of the National Government, positions he has held since 1932, probably accounts for his appointment.

SHAO Li-tzu is reported to be an able political leader. For a year before he joined the Kuomintang, he was a member of the Chinese Communist Party. He was at one time Ambassador to the USSR and is said to favor cooperation with the Soviet Union.

3. Other Members. The prominence of SUN Fo in the Kuomintang Party is due almost entirely to his prestige as the son of Sun Yat-sen. He has criticized the party, but it does not dare to touch him. Sun is considered fairly liberal, honest, and efficient, but evidently lacks the spark to create a definite line of policy against the more conservative elements.

There are conflicting reports about WU Chung-hsin and his political preference, but he is known to be a willing supporter of the Generalissimo. One source states that he is close to the Political Science Clique and another that he is closely affiliated with the CC Clique. As Governor of Sinkiang, he was unable to handle the political and financial situations there.

T. V. SOONG has held party and government positions for many

years and is credited with most of the modern reforms in Chinese finance. Essentially, Soong has been a supporter of the Generalissimo's policies, and the conflicts that have arisen between them have been on a personal level. Although he has a strong following in the United States, it is doubtful that Soong has very much political support in his own country. In March of this year, the CC and Political Science Cliques joined in forcing his resignation as President of the Executive Yuan. However, his present appointment to the State Council was almost mandatory because of his position in international financial circles, especially American. Soong is ambitious, greatly interested in domestic and foreign commercial business, and is extremely Western in outlook and manner.

CHANG Chia Hutuketu, a Mongol, is a party veteran who has consistently recognized the governments of China. It is possible that his appointment is intended as a placatory gesture toward minorities and regional areas.

It has been reported that CH'EN Pu-lei is close to Chiang Kai-shek and is a friend and adviser of Ch'en Li-fu, head of the CC Clique. One source states that he may nevertheless be expected to support the policies of the Political Science faction.

CHIANG Mon-lin has been active in the field of education for many years. He is a loyal supporter of Chiang Kai-shek.

B. Executive Yuan

The reorganization of the Executive Yuan is essentially little more than a slight reshuffle. The more important posts are held by the same men who were in office before the reorganization. Two persons have been shifted to different positions and five have been newly appointed to relatively unimportant posts.

P'ENG Hsueh-p'ei, former Minister of Information, is now Minister without Portfolio, and WENG Wen-hao, former Vice-President of the Executive Yuan is now National Resources Commissioner. KAN Nai-kuang, a party and government official for many years, is Secretary General of the Yuan. He is reportedly a follower of Sun Fo and is said to have supported Wang Ch'ing-wei in the 1920's. Hollington K. TONG, Government Information Director, has been a publisher and editor for many years. He is the official biographer of Chiang Kai-shek. Tong is said to be a moderate of the Western group rather than a supporter of the right wing of the Kuomintang. However, he has no political strength. LI Ching-chai, Land Administrator, is reportedly a CC man. LIU Wei-chih, Director of Overseas Chinese Affairs, is a follower of Sun Fo. The affiliation of LEI Chen, Minister without Portfolio, is not known.

C. Kuomintang Political Council

The core of the Kuomintang Political Council is the appointed membership, a group of 24 men dominated by the CC Clique and the military group, with a sprinkling of party elders and a few members of

minor cliques. Twenty-five men were appointed to the new Kuomintang Political Council, but one of these men, PO Wen-wei (PAI Wen-wei) died on April 26, 1947. Another appointed member, TSENG Yang-fu, has been ill for several years.

The most striking feature of this group is its lack of "big names." CH'EN Li-fu, HO Ying-ch'in, and the two warlords FENG Yu-hsiang and YEN Hsi-shan are the only men who are well known. None of the other members are actively engaged in the government or party affairs.

In addition to the appointed members, with CHIANG Kai-shek as Chairman, the group includes ex-officio members that bring the Council to almost 80 members. Of this total, roughly 13 are party elders, 15 are members of the CC Clique, 15 are military men, and about 20 are members whose affiliations are unknown but who can best be described as machine members. There is an additional group of about 11 that includes supporters of Soong, Kung, Sun Fo, and others. Finally there is a group of 5 belonging to the Political Science faction. Through its ex-officio members, the powerful elements of the party and government are represented.

1. CC Clique Members. Eight members of the CC Clique were appointed to the Political Council. CH'EN Li-fu, the leader of the Clique, serves as Secretary General of the Council. Two of the appointed members -- KU Chen-ting and YU Ching-t'ang -- were close associates of his

in the party Ministry of Organization. YU Ching-t'ang, reputed to be Ch'en Li-fu's right hand man, has been a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee since 1935 and was Vice Minister of Education from 1938 to 1944. KU Cheng-ting, a graduate of Moscow University and Sun Yat-sen University, has been a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang since 1935. The other five CC members -- CHI Shih-ying, FANG Chih, HSU K'an, TSENG Yang-fu, and LI Ching-chai -- have all had long party experience. The group of ex-officio members includes such well-known figures of the CC Clique as CHANG Li-sheng, CH'EN Kuo-fu, KU Cheng-kang, LIANG Han-chao, and PAN Kung-chan. These men have all had long party careers.

2. Military Members. Nine members of the military groups are among the appointed members of the Political Council. Of these, HO Ying-ch'in of the Whampoa Clique is perhaps the best known. He was one of the early revolutionaries and has been a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee since 1928 and a member of the standing committee of the Central Executive Committee since 1937. He was Minister of War and Chief of Staff during the war and is at present in the United States as the Chinese delegate to the Military Staff Council of the United Nations.

FENG Yu-hsiang, one of the northern warlords, has been in and out of the government for many years. He has been known as one of the liberal members of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. The other warlord, YEN Hsi-shan, who has for many years been governor of

Shansi Province, has played off one side against the other in order to keep control of Shansi.

LI Tsung-jen, often considered the leader of the Kwangsi Clique, is a veteran member of the party and is said to be friendly with the members of the Political Science Clique. He is in Hongkong at present.

The other outstanding member of this group is General CH'ENG Ch'ien, a conservative, who is at present Director of the Generalissimo's Headquarters in Wuhan.

The other military men appointed to the Political Council are LO Chung-lin (a Feng Yu-hsiang man), HSU Yung-ch'ang (a Yen Hsi-shan man), CH'EN Chi-t'ang (former Kwangtung warlord), and CHU Shao-liang.

The two outstanding ex-officio military members are Generals CH'EN Ch'eng and PAI Ch'ung-hsi. General CH'EN Ch'eng, who taught at the Whampoa Military Academy for a year in 1924-25, is the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of National Defense and is generally regarded as one of the more modern military leaders. General PAI Ch'ung-hsi, a rival, is a member of the Kwangsi Clique and Minister of National Defense.

3. Other Members. Of the total of 49 other members in the Political Council, 13 are "party elders." No Political Science members were appointed to the Council, but 5 of the ex-officio members are members of this faction.

Four of the men appointed to the Political Council cannot be classified as belonging to any of the cliques or factions. CHENG Yen-fen

is reputed to be a Generalissimo man connected with the San Min Chu I Youth Corps for Kwangtung, Hongkong, and Macao. LI Yu-ying was educated in France and for many years has worked in the international and educational fields. Since 1942 he has been in the United States as publisher of the Chinese edition of Free World (Tsu-yu Shih-chieh). He is supposedly supported by T. V. Soong and interested in the overseas Chinese. KAN Nai-kuang is a Sun Fo man. The last member of this group, P'ENG Hsueh-p'ei, is a Soong man. The ex-officio members of this group are CHU Chia-hua, Madame SUN Yat-sen, SUN Fo, and T. V. Soong.